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Abstract: Spoofing attacks are one of the security traits that biometric recognition
systems are proven to be vulnerable to. When spoofed, a biometric recognition system
is bypassed by presenting a copy of the biometric evidence of a valid user. Among
all biometric modalities, spoofing a face recognition system is particularly easy to
perform: all that is needed is a simple photograph of the user.
In this paper, we address the problem of detecting face spoofing attacks. In par-
ticular, we inspect the potential of texture features based on Local Binary Patterns
(LBP) and their variations on three types of attacks: printed photographs, and photos
and videos displayed on electronic screens of different sizes. For this purpose, we in-
troduce REPLAY-ATTACK, a novel publicly available face spoofing database which
contains all the mentioned types of attacks. We conclude that LBP, with ∼15% Half
Total Error Rate, show moderate discriminability when confronted with a wide set of
attack types.
1 Introduction
Spoofing attack is the action of outwitting a biometric sensor by presenting a counterfeit
biometric evidence of a valid user [NAR08]. It is a direct attack to the sensory input of a
biometric system and the attacker does not need previous knowledge about the recognition
algorithm. Most of the biometric modalities are not resistant to spoofing attacks: the bio-
metric systems are usually designed to only recognize identities without concern whether
the identity is live or not. Despite the existence of very sophisticated biometric authenti-
cation and verification systems nowadays, implementing anti-spoofing schemes for them
is still in its infancy.
Depending on the biometric modality being attacked, fabricating fake biometric data can
have different levels of difficulty. While creating an artificial finger to spoof a fingerprint
recognition system, or printing contact lens to spoof an iris recognition system may require
some expertise, it is very easy to create a copy of someone’s face. All that is needed is a
photograph of the person, which can be easily found on the Internet or taken directly from
the user at distance. The assumptions that the artificial biometric evidence can bypass a
biometric recognition system, are not only chimerical: in [DM09] the authors have shown
how to successfully spoof a laptop authentication system using only a printed photograph.
Since face spoofing attracted the attention of the biometric community, a number of pub-
lications which address the problem in different ways have appeared [NAR08]. Possible
options include engaging additional devices to detect if there is a live person in front of the
camera, or asking the user to respond to some challenge, like making a particular gesture.
However, completely automatic systems which do not rely on additional hardware and are
not intrusive are cheaper and more convenient for the user.
The development of new algorithms to solve the problem is not possible without a public
database which catalogs many different types of attacks. The purpose of this paper is two-
fold. Firstly, we introduce a novel publicly available database, called REPLAY-ATTACK,
with three types of attacks and accompanied by a protocol and a baseline study of its
effectiveness in bypassing biometric recognition systems. Secondly, we study the strength
of texture features based on Local Binary Patters (LBP) to discriminate between real access
and a spoof attack. In support of the idea for reproducible research, the database is freely
available for public use, while the method is simple and easy to re-implement. Its source
code is also freely available for reproduction of results.
In what follows, we give a brief overview of the state-of-the-art anti-spoofing measures
and the efforts in creating face spoofing database up to now in Section 2. In Section 3 we
present REPLAY-ATTACK and its companion protocols. Section 4 describes the studied
counter-measure, followed by experimental results in Section 5. Conclusions and direc-
tions for future research are given in Section 6.
2 Related work
Summary of existing anti-spoofing methods. The existing anti-spoofing methods gen-
erally move towards one of three directions: analyzing the texture of the image captured by
the sensor, detecting any evidence of liveness on the scene or combining both approaches
together. Focusing on the texture based methods, the first attempt towards spoofing de-
tection was made in [L+04], where the authors argue that the frequency distributions on
the image of a live person and the image of an attack are different. In [B+10], the au-
thors decompose the face image into a specular (reflectance) and diffusion component.
They conclude that recaptured images show reflectance characteristics of paper and ink
and achieve Equal Error Rate (EER) of 6.7%. Using the Lambertian reflectance model
and Difference of Gaussians (DoG) filtering, [T+10] extracts two types of latent sam-
ples which are representatives of the texture of the image. The algorithms achieves an
Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC) value of 0.95. The DoG approach is also employed
in [Z+12], where the image is processed with 4 DoG filters with different values of σ and
the achieved EER is 17%.
Most recently, the approach proposed in [MHP11] exploits yet another texture feature,
LBP. Each image is represented with a feature vector which is a concatenation of a LBPu216,2
histogram over the whole image, LBPu28,1 histograms of 9 overlapping blocks in which the
image is divided, and a LBPu28,1 histogram over the whole image. In the notation LBP
u2
P,R,
the superscript stands for uniform LBP, while the subscripts refer to the number of points
P which form the LBP code and are taken on a circle of radius R around the central pixel.
The resulting multi-scale LBP based feature vectors have dimensionality of 833 and are
fed to an SVM for a final classification.
Another category of anti-spoofing methods focus on detection of a live-face specific mo-
tion on the scene, such as eye-blinking, mouth movements or head movements. Examples
of methods using eye-blinking detection are proposed in [PWS08] and [JUY06]. There
are a number of publications which analyze specific properties of the human head as a 3D
object and its movements, like [KFB09] or [B+09]. Both methods use optical flow field
for motion estimation and report EER of 0.5% and HTER of 10% respectively. [AM11]
states that in the case of an attack using a photograph, there should be high correlation
between the total amount of movement in the face region and the scene background. The
algorithm achieves HTER of 8.98%.
Most of the mentioned papers test their methods on attacks with printed photographs.
Both motion-based and texture-based anti-spoofing measures have confirmed their dis-
criminability in such cases. In this work we go one step further: we exploit the capabilities
of texture-based features to reveal the difference between real accesses and attacks with
photographs and videos.
Summary of existing face spoofing databases. Many of the previously mentioned pa-
pers test their proposed counter-measures on databases which they have developed, but
are not publicly available. The lack of publicly available databases and protocols obstructs
fair evaluation and comparison of the different anti-spoofing methods. The first database
designed specifically for development of anti-spoofing algorithms, is the NUAA Photo-
graph Imposter Database (from this point onwards referred as NUAA) which accompa-
nies [T+10] and consists only of attacks with printed photographs. Its main disadvantage,
besides the limited number of identities (15 in total), is the provision of still images instead
of videos, which makes it unusable for motion-based algorithms. The protocol provided by
NUAA can not be considered as complete, because it contains only training and test data
and overlooks development data for fine tuning of the classifiers. In [Z+12] the authors
propose a face anti-spoofing database (from this point onward referred as CASIA-FASD)
with three types of attacks: warped printed photographs, printed photographs with perfo-
rated eye regions and a video playbacks. In a certain sense, CASIA-FASD can be con-
sidered as an addendum of NUAA database, solving its two main drawbacks and adding
attacks with video playbacks. However, it inherits the lack of a complete protocol. PRINT-
ATTACK [AM11] is the first database which provides precise protocol with training, de-
velopment and test set. It contains videos of attacks only with printed photographs to 50
different identities.
A database adequate for developing anti-spoofing algorithms should provide attacks capa-
ble of penetrating unprotected face recognition systems. Each database should provide an
evaluation of the scores that a baseline face recognition system generates for spoof attacks
to one identity. So far, NUAA and CASIA-FASD databases do not provide such evidence.
In Section 3 we present REPLAY-ATTACK, a novel face-spoofing database targeting to
challenge the most advanced spoofing counter-measures. Not only it enriches PRINT-
ATTACK by adding more diverse spoofing attacks, but it also provides a protocol for fair
counter-measure comparison and proves the vulnerability of a face recognition system to
its attacks.
3 The REPLAY-ATTACK database
The REPLAY-ATTACK biometric (face) database1 consists of short video recordings of
both real-access and attack attempts to 50 different identities. In this section we give the
setup for database recording, describe the set of companion protocols and evaluate the
effectiveness of the collected attacks.
Setup for database recording. To create the dataset each person recorded a number of
videos at 2 different stationary conditions: (1) controlled (the background of the scene
is uniform and the light of a fluorescent lamp illuminates the scene); and (2) adverse
(the background of the scene is non-uniform and day-light illuminates the scene). People
were asked to sit down in front of a custom acquisition system built on an Apple 13-inch
MacBook laptop and capture two video sequences with a resolution of 320 by 240 pixels
(QVGA), at 25 frames-per-second and of 15 seconds each (375 frames). The acquisition
process is the same as for the PRINT-ATTACK database and it is thoroughly described
in [AM11].
Collecting samples and generating the attacks. Under the same illumination and back-
ground settings used for real-access video clips, the acquisition operator took two high-
resolution pictures of each person using a 12.1 megapixel Canon PowerShot SX150 IS
camera and with an iPhone 3GS (3.1 megapixel camera), that would be used as basis
for the spoofing attempts. To realize the attacks, the operator forges an attack as de-
scribed in one of the following scenarios: (1) print (the operator displays hard copies of
the high-resolution digital photographs printed on plain A4 paper using a Triumph-Adler
DCC 2520 color laser printer); (2) mobile (the operator displays photos and videos taken
with the iPhone using the iPhone screen); and (3) highdef (the operator displays the high-
resolution digital photos and videos using an iPad screen with resolution (1024 by 768
pixels). Each attack video is captured for about 10 seconds in two different attack modes:
(1) hand-based attacks (the operator holds the attack media or device using their own
hands); and (2) fixed-support attacks (the operator sets the attack device on a fixed support
so they do not move during the spoof attempt). The first set of (hand-based) attacks show
a shaking behavior which can sometimes trick eye-blinking detectors [PWS08]. Figure 1
shows some frames of the captured spoofing attempts.
Protocols. The total set of videos in the database is decomposed into 3 subsets allowing
for training, development and testing of binary classifiers. Identities for each subset were
chosen randomly, but do not overlap, i.e. people that are on one of the subsets do not
appear in any other set. Moreover, each attack subset can be sub-classified into two groups
that split the attacking support used during the acquisition (hand-based or fixed-support).
Counter-measures developed using this database can report error figures that consider both
separated and aggregated grouping, from which it is possible to understand which types
of attacks are better handled by the proposed method. Table 1 summarizes the number of
videos taken for both real-access and attack attempts and how they are split in the different
subsets and groups.
In the case the developed counter-measure requires training, it is recommended that train-
ing and development samples are used to train classifiers. One trivial example is to use
1http://www.idiap.ch/dataset/replayattack
Figure 1: Examples of real accesses and attacks in different scenarios. In the top row, samples from
controlled scenario. In the bottom row, samples from adverse scenario. Columns from left to right
show examples of real access, printed photograph, mobile phone and tablet attacks.
Table 1: Number of videos in each database subset. Numbers displayed as sums indicate the amount
of hand-based and fixed-support attacks available in each subset when relevant.
Type Train Devel. Test Total
Real-access 60 60 80 200
Print-attack 30+30 30+30 40+40 100+100
Phone-Attack 60+60 60+60 80+80 200+200
Tablet-Attack 60+60 60+60 80+80 200+200
Total 360 360 480 1200
the training set for training the classifier itself and the development data to estimate when
to stop training. The test set should be solely used to report error rates and performance
curves.
Effectiveness of Attacks. The REPLAY-ATTACK database provides an extra set of 100
videos that are not part of the “spoofing” scenarios defined above. The videos correspond
to enrollment sequences for each of the 50 clients, in the two illumination conditions as
described above. The enrollment videos are grouped respecting the same definitions for
the data in spoofing attacks - identities do not overlap between training, development and
test subsets. The videos should be used to train a baseline face-recognition classifier which
can then be used to estimate the quality of attacks contained in the database.
4 Anatomy of the studied counter-measure
Simple visual inspection of an image of a real user and a recaptured image of the same
user shows that the two images can be very similar and even the human eye may find it
difficult to make a distinction at first glance (see Figure 1). Yet, some disparities between
the real face and spoof-attack images may become evident once the images are translated
into a proper feature space. These differences come from the fact that the human face as a
3D object, as well as the human skin, have their own optical qualities (absorption, reflec-
tion, scattering, refraction), which other materials (paper, photographic paper or electronic
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Figure 2: Block diagram of the proposed LBP based anti-spoofing algorithm
display) do not possess [PDT05]. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the texture
properties of real accesses and spoof-attacks will be different.
In this work, we try to capture the texture properties of the images with features based
on the Local Binary Patterns (LBP) operator introduced in [OPM02]. The most simple
LBP pattern for a particular pixel, usually denoted as LBP3×3, is formed by comparing the
intensity values of that pixel with the intensity values of the pixels in its 3x3 neighborhood.
In this way, each pixel is assigned a label with value from 0 to 28 − 1. In the case of
uniform LBP (LBPu2), only the labels which contain at most two 0-1 or 1-0 transitions
are considered. The feature vector of an image, or a region of the image, is formed by
calculating a histogram of the pixel labels.
Figure 2 displays a flow diagram for a complete overview of the counter-measure. The
feature vectors are computed per frame. In this way, each frame of the videos in REPLAY-
ATTACK and CASIA-FASD databases is considered as an independent sample in both
training and testing sets. This choice enables fair comparison with the NUAA database
which only provides images. The computed feature vectors apply to face bounding boxes
normalized to 64x64 pixels. Unfortunately, the face detection process is not error free. In
case a certain frame in the input video stream presents no detected face, the face detection
is borrowed from any previous frame which had one. If there is no previous frame with
detected face, the frame is discarded from further analysis.
The feature vector which is used for spoofing detection in this work is a simple nor-
malized histogram of LBPu23×3 codes, as opposed to the concatenation of more complex
parametrized LBP proposed in [MHP11]. As depicted in Figure 2, we calculate the LBP
histogram in two different ways, and perform all the experiments separately on the both
versions of the feature vectors. The first option is to calculate the LBP features for all pix-
els in the image and distribute them in one histogram (per-image calculated features). In
this case, the total number of bins in the histogram, and thus the number of dimensions of
the feature vector is 59. The second option is to divide the image into 3x3 blocks, calculate
the LBP histograms for each of the blocks separately and form the final feature vector by
their concatenation (per-block computed features). This results in a feature vector with
531 dimensions. The motivation for using blocks comes from the fact that the texture ar-
tifacts of the spoof attacks may be more visible in small and local uniform areas of the
image, such as the forehead or the cheeks [MHP11].
Our work also includes experimentation with alternative LBP features, namely, the set of
extended LBP as proposed in [TM10]. It includes transitional (tLBP), direction-coded
(dLBP) and modified LBP (mLBP). The tLBP operator forms the binary patterns by com-
paring two consecutive neighboring pixels of the central pixel circularly in clockwise di-
rection. The dLBP encodes the intensity variation along the four base directions through
the central pixel in two bits. The mLBP, similarly to Modified Census Transform (MCT)
features proposed in [FE04], compares the values of the neighboring pixels to the average
of the intensity values in the 3x3 neighborhood. Unlike MCT, it discards the comparison
of the central pixel with the average from the final code.
Since the feature vectors that we obtain from the images are histograms, the first classifier
applied to the extracted features is χ2 histogram comparison. We create reference his-
tograms for the real accesses by averaging the histograms of the corresponding training
samples. Reference histogram of attacks is not considered because the attacks are of many
different types and hence their mean histogram is not a good overall representative of the
cluster of attacks. Then, the feature vectors of the probe images are assigned a score as
a result of χ2 comparison with the reference histogram. A similar approach has already
shown very good performance on the PRINT-ATTACK database [C+11].
More complex classifiers were examined as well: a linear one, Linear Discriminant Anal-
ysis (LDA) and a non-linear one, Support Vector Machine (SVM) with radial kernel basis
function.
The studied algorithm is implemented using the free signal-processing and machine learn-
ing toolbox Bob2 [A+12] and the source code of the algorithm is available as an anti-
spoofing satellite package3.
5 Experiments and results
In this section we give a performance evaluation of the studied anti-spoofing algorithm.
Before proceeding with the experiments, we give an overview of the methodology we use
to report the results and we report on the effectiveness of the attacks in REPLAY-ATTACK
to spoof a baseline face recognition system.
5.1 Performance measure
A spoofing detection system is subject to two types of errors, either the real access is re-
jected (false rejection) or an attack is accepted (false acceptance). Its performance is often
measured with Half Total Error Rate (HTER), which is half of the sum of the False Rejec-
tion Rate (FRR) and the False Acceptance Rate (FAR). Since both the FAR and the FRR
depend on a threshold τ , increasing the FAR will usually reduce the FRR and vice-versa.
For this reason, results are often presented using the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve, which plots the FAR versus the FRR for different values of τ . Another
widely used measure is the Equal Error Rate (EER), defined as the point along the ROC
curve where the FAR equals the FRR. The threshold τ should be chosen on the develop-
ment set and the HTER reported using the test set. As means of uniforming reports, we
2http://www.idiap.ch/software/bob/
3https://github.com/bioidiap/antispoofing.lbp
recommend choosing the threshold τ on the EER at the development set.
5.2 Measuring the effectiveness of the attacks
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the REPLAY-ATTACK spoofs to get through a face
recognition system, we implemented a Parts-Based Gaussian Mixture Model (PB-GMM)
baseline4 [CSM03]. According to a recent experimental evaluation of face recognition
methods [W+12], this method provides a trade-off in terms of complexity and performance
accuracy. For this system, if one sets a threshold on the EER of the development set, the
number of attacks that would be incorrectly classified as clients would be slightly above
82%. This validates the attacks in REPLAY-ATTACK as valuable for further investigation
of counter-measures. As no enrollment data is provided for NUAA and CASIA-FASD
databases, it is not possible to do such an evaluation for these databases.
5.3 Performance evaluation of the studied anti-spoofing algorithm
We provide a number of performance evaluation tables which give the results of the clas-
sification with respect to different criteria. Firstly, we compare the effectiveness of the dif-
ferent types of LBP to detect spoofing attacks. Secondly, taking only the best-performing
type of LBP from the first experiment, we compare the performance of features computed
per-image and per-block. Our third experiment evaluates the classification methods. It
also compares the algorithm’s performance to the reimplementation of the algorithm pro-
posed in [MHP11]. Finally, we apply the studied counter-measure and the algorithm given
in [MHP11] to all the available databases.
Comparison of the types of LBP. Inspired by the performance that the χ2 statistics
based classifier has shown on attacks with printed photographs [C+11], we made an eval-
uation of regular LBPu23×3 and the extended set of LBP [TM10] using this classification
method on REPLAY-ATTACK. The HTER of the classification for both the development
and test set for per-image computed LBP histograms is given in Table 2.
Table 2: HTER (%) of classification with χ2 for different types of LBP features
LBPu23×3 tLBP dLBP mLBP
dev test dev test dev test dev test
31.24 34.01 29.37 35.35 36.71 40.26 32.29 33.68
Although very efficient for printed spoofing attacks, probably due to apparent printing ar-
tifacts, LBP is not as discriminative with the other types of attacks in REPLAY-ATTACK.
As it can be seen from Table 2, the lowest HTER on the test set is achieved by using mLBP,
followed by LBPu23×3. Despite the very tight superiority of mLBP over LBP
u2
3×3, we will
continue the further evaluation only using LBPu23×3. The motivation for this lies in the fact
that LBPu23×3 is much more commonly used then mLBP and this makes the comparison of
the algorithms more consistent. Furthermore, computing mLBP requires one additional
operation for calculating the average of the intensity values in the 3x3 neighborhood of a
given pixel.
Per-image vs. per-block calculated features. Our second experiment compares the
performance of χ2 classifier with respect to the features computed per-image and per-
4Code available at: https://github.com/bioidiap/antispoofing.verification.gmm
block. Their dimensions are 59 and 531 respectively. The results are given in Table 3. We
can conclude that enlarging the feature vector 9 times does not improve the performance,
as the HTER in the first case is about the same as in the second case on both development
and test set. Therefore, in the rest of the experiments with REPLAY-ATTACK we will
consider only the features computed on the full image, which is more optimal in terms of
computational and memory resources.
Table 3: HTER (%) of classification with χ2 for LBP codes computed per-image and per-block
per-image computed LBPu23×3 per-block computed LBPu23×3
dev test dev test
31.24 34.01 33.66 34.30
Comparison of the classifiers. In the following experiment, we compare the simple
χ2 statistics method to more sophisticated classifiers (LDA and SVM). We also reimple-
mented the algorithm proposed in [MHP11], where the feature vector with length of 833
is composed of concatenated LBP histograms and the used classifier is also a SVM. The
results are given in Table 4 .
Table 4: HTER (%) of classification with different classifiers
LBPu23×3 + χ2 LBPu23×3 + LDA LBPu23×3 + SVM LBP [MHP11] + SVM
dev test dev test dev test dev test
31.24 34.01 19.60 17.17 14.84 15.16 13.90 13.87
While the improvement of the results when using LDA over the classification with χ2 is
notable, introducing non-linearity with SVM into the classification system decreases the
HTER on the test set by only 2%. This comes with the cost of a very large SVM with a lot
of support vectors, which means low computational performance during the classification.
For example, the total number of support vectors is 25717 for feature vectors of length 59.
Features proposed in [MHP11] bring additional improvement of 1.3%, but they are 14
times bigger then our features and the total size of the SVM is even larger in this case.
Performance of the algorithm on different databases. Finally, in Table 5 we present
the performance of the algorithm on all the available face-spoofing databases. As an addi-
tion, we report the results that we obtained with the reimplemented version of the method
proposed in [MHP11].
It should be remarked that, due to the lack of development set on NUAA and CASIA-
FASD databases, the only option was to evaluate the algorithm using cross-validation by
randomly dividing the training data into 5 folds. The results presented for these databases
are actually the average HTER on the test set over 5 iterations of the algorithm with dif-
ferent folds playing the role of a development set.
It is also interesting to point out that when experimenting with NUAA and CASIA-FASD,
better results were achieved with per-block computed features. Therefore, in Table 5, the
features for REPLAY-ATTACK are computed per-image, while the features for the other
two databases are computed per-block.
From Table 5, we discuss three crucial matters. Firstly, we observe the generalization
capabilities of the algorithm on the NUAA database. Secondly, we examine the gain in
Table 5: HTER (%) of the classification on different databases. The average standard deviation of
the HTER over the 5 cross-fold validation iterations on NUAA and CASIA-FASD is at most 1%.
∗Features replicated from [MHP11] using Bob and classification performed using Bob.
‡Result reported in [MHP11]: features generated using the Matlab implementation of LBP and
classification performed using LIBSVM.
§Features from [MHP11] provided by the authors and classification performed using Bob.
REPLAY-ATTACK NUAA CASIA-FASD
dev test dev test dev test
LBPu23×3 + LDA 19.60 17.17 0.06 18.32 17.08 21.01
LBPu23×3 + SVM 14.84 15.16 0.11 19.03 16.00 18.17
LBP [MHP11] + SVM ∗ 13.90 13.87 0.11 13.17 15.43 18.21
LBP [MHP11] + SVM ‡ - - - 2.5 - -
LBP [MHP11] + SVM § - - 3.21 4.23 - -
precision versus the complexity of the classifier. Lastly, we highlight a disparity between
the results obtained with our reimplementation of the method in [MHP11] and the results
reported by the authors.
The first thing to notice in Table 5 is the tendency of the classifiers to overfit on the training
set of the NUAA database. Both LDA and SVM yield high performance on the develop-
ment set, but are less effective on the test set. This can be explained by the fact that the
classification threshold is chosen on the development set, which for NUAA is actually a
subset of the training set, as we perform cross-validation. This problem can be taken as an
indication for the necessity of a precise protocol with separate training, development and
test set in spoof-attack databases.
From Table 5 we can also observe that the non-linear classifier gives just minor improve-
ment over LDA not only in REPLAY-ATTACK, as shown before, but also on NUAA and
CASIA databases. Moreover, expanding the feature vector to very high dimensionality
like in [MHP11] does not guarantee good generalization for NUAA, nor does help for
better performance on CASIA database.
Table 5 contains two additional rows. The first one is the HTER on the NUAA database
as reported in [MHP11]. We can observe that there is a difference between the HTER
we obtained by reimplementing the method in [MHP11] (13.17%) and the reported value
(2.5%). Therefore, we asked the authors to send us, for comparison purposes, their features
generated using the Matlab implementation of LBP5. The last row of Table 5 gives the
HTER of the algorithm that we obtained with the features they provided to us, and it
amounts 4.23%. The small difference between this value and the value reported in the
paper is probably due to a different cross-validation schemes in the both settings. However,
the question remains what causes the disparity between the results obtained with the two
implementations.
After thorough investigation, we found that the Matlab implementation of LBP responds
unexpectedly in certain conditions. On the contrary, the LBP implementation of Bob ap-
5http://www.cse.oulu.fi/CMV/Downloads/LBPMatlab
pears to handle these conditions correctly. Namely, when calculating the circular LBPu28,1
and LBPu216,2 required for the features in [MHP11], there is a need for calculating interpo-
lated values of particular points in the image. The Matlab implementation of LBP does not
handle correctly bilinear interpolation in some cases due to precision problems, leading to
completely different LBP codes. The anomaly seems to affect ∼4% of the LBP codes for
some of the test images. We informed the authors about this issue for further investigation,
especially to understand why the anomaly produces better performance.
6 Conclusion
Spoofing and anti-spoofing has become a prevalent topic in the biometrics community.
Regardless of the sophistication of a particular face recognition system, it should not be
completely trusted if it does not have a protection against spoofing attacks.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows. Firstly, it introduces
REPLAY-ATTACK, a novel spoofing attack database containing three types of possible
attacks using three different media and two different recording conditions. The database
includes a protocol for training, development and testing purposes, and also proves the
vulnerability of a baseline face recognition system to its attacks. Secondly, it proposes
simple and easily reproducible LBP based face spoofing counter-measure and explores
its efficiency against a variety of attacks. Variants of LBP were also investigated, but
the regular LBPu23×3 shows the best performance/complexity tradeoff. The simple setup
and low-dimensional features manage to reach reasonable performance even without us-
ing complex non-linear classifiers whose size can be inconvenient for fast computation.
In support of reproducible research, the database, its protocols, as well as the source code
will be made publicly available.
The LBP based anti-spoofing method guarantees different levels of certainty for different
types of attacks and different databases. Some attacks can deceive this counterfeit more
easily then others. There is no consistency in the results with regards to the types of attacks,
nor the attacks from different databases. Our belief is that this is not valid only for texture-
based methods, but also for methods that approach the problem from different aspect. The
various face spoofing attacks differ from the real accesses in their own particular manner:
the devices that are used introduce different artifacts and the amount and type of movement
they possess is different. In other words, the cues that distinguish two different types of
face spoofing attacks from real accesses differ in their essence and should be grasped
in their own unique way. There is not a single notion which describes all the types of
attacks. Hence, we believe that the future work in the field of anti-spoofing should focus on
addressing as more spoofing attacks as possible with separate attack-specific approaches.
Another option is to congregate the characteristics of all the real accesses into a single
model to which none of the spoofing attacks will relate in any sense.
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